EVIDENCE-VoICE

SPECTROGRAPHY-RELIABILITY

OF

VOICE-

PRINTS NOT ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE INADMISSIBLE-Wind-

mere, Inc. v. InternationalInsurance Co., 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d

405 (1987).
Every useful new development must have its first day in court.
Historically, proponents of novel scientific technology have
found courts reluctant to admit new developments into evidence.2 Voice spectrography, a process more commonly known
as voiceprint analysis, 3 is one example of courts' hesitancy to admit scientific evidence. 4 Surfacing as a possible identification
I United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970). In Stifel, the court
admitted into evidence expert testimony regarding neutron activation analysis to
help identify the source of bomb package debris. Id. at 435. This testimony was
instrumental in convicting the defendant. See id.
2 See generally Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980) (discussing problems
associated with the admissibility of novel scientific evidence). See also Note,
Voiceprints in the Courtroom-Scientific and Evidentiary Problems, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1163,
1180 (1979). The reluctance to admit novel developments stems from the evidentiary standards employed by the courts. Id. at 1188. Three different admissibility
tests are presently utilized for scientific evidence: (1) The Frye test, articulated in
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), which requires "general
acceptance in the scientific community"; (2) the Williams test, applied in People v.
Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958), which modifies Frye
to require acceptance by those scientists familiar with the techniques used; and
(3) the Federal Rules of Evidence test, which admits evidence from a qualified witness unless there are reasons for its exclusion. Id. at 1176-1179. See infra notes 3138 & 119-123 and accompanying text (discussing the Frye and Federal Rules of
Evidence standards). The Second Circuit in United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d
1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979), advocated a fourth standard,
the reliability test, which admits scientific evidence shown to be sufficiently accurate. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
3 Voiceprint analysis has been defined as "a method of sound identification
which utilizes the spectrograph machine. This machine decomposes the sound of
the human voice into components which are graphically recorded, thus producing
the spectrogram or voiceprint. Voiceprints are then compared by persons trained
in the use of the method for possible identification purposes." State v. Andretta, 61
N.J. 544, 546, 296 A.2d 644, 645 (1972).
4 See United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975). For courts ruling against admissibility, see United States v. Addison,
498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); State v. Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 686 P.2d 1224
(1984); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976);
Cornett v. State, 450 N.E.2d 498 (Ind. 1983); State v. Free, 493 So.2d 781 (La. Ct.
App. 1986); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401
Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d
1277 (1977). For courts which have found voiceprints to be admissible, see United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979);
United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bailer, 519
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tool in the early 1960's,5 voiceprint technology first appeared in
the courtroom later in that decade. 6 New Jersey Supreme Court
decisions in the 1960's and 1970's concerning voiceprint evidence left unresolved the issue of the admissibility of such evidence. v Recently, however, in Windmere, Inc. v. International
Insurance Co. ,' the court had occasion to address the issue of
voiceprint admissibility.9 The Windmere court held that the reliability of voiceprints, in terms of general acceptance within the
scientific community, was not established at trial, and therefore
the spectrogram analysis was inadmissible.' 0
On March 12, 1982, the West Milford Police Department received an anonymous phone call reporting a fire at the
Crosswinds Restaurant. 1 The police department recorded the
F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Sample, 378
F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Alea v. State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass.
191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192
N.W.2d 432 (1971); People v. Bein, 114 Misc. 2d 1021,453 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct.
1982); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983); State v. Wheeler,
496 A.2d 1382 (R.I. 1985).
5 See Note, supra note 2, at 1168. Voiceprint identification is based on the theory that no two human voices are exactly alike. Id. at 1164. Proponents claim that
"[i]ntelligible speech is the product of a complex physiological and mechanical operation," which cannot be disguised. Id. They assert "that individuals differ in the
size and shape of the oral and nasal cavities and in the structure of the larynx, and
in the particular but stable habit patterns in which they use in this vocal apparatus."
Id. at 1164-65. By comparing the voices of both known and unknown speakers
uttering ten commonly used English words--"the, to, and, me, on, is, you, I, it, and
a"-a voiceprint analyst can determine whether the two voices are the same. Id. at
1166; Kersta, Speaker Recognition and Identification By Voiceprints, 40 CONN. B.J. 586,
586 (1966).
6 Trial courts in New York and California admitted voiceprint evidence in the
two earliest known cases. See Cohen, The Watts Voiceprint Case: A TV Boast That
Trapped an Arsonist, L.A. Times, Mar. 26, 1967 (West Magazine), at 12; Use
"Voiceprints "As Evidence In Watts Arson Trial, 89 N.J.L.J. 776 (1966); Voiceprint Allowed
as Evidence; Ruling Called First of Its Kind, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1966, at A-l, col. 2.
7 State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 551, 296 A.2d 644, 648 (1972). See State v.
Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230 A.2d 384, 388-89 (1967), on remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323,
239 A.2d 680 (Law Div. 1968), reh'g granted, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), aff'd,
56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). See also infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text
(discussing the unresolved issue of admissibility of voiceprint evidence in State v.
Cary).
8 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d 405 (1987).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 386, 522 A.2d at 412. The court stated that "[w]hile in this case the
voiceprint evidence should not have been admitted, its future use as a reasonably
reliable scientific method may not be precluded forever if more thorough proofs as
to reliability are introduced in other litigation." Id.
I IId. at 387, 522 A.2d at 412. In addition to reporting the fire, the caller reported that the building contained a bomb. Id.
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telephone call. 2 During investigation of the fire's origin, the police discovered a five-gallon plastic container which contained
gasoline residue.'" In addition, the police questioned several
people at the fire, including Howard Bodell, the Crosswinds Restaurant's maintenance man' 4 who was at the scene of the fire moments after the blaze began.' 5 Confronted with the gasoline
container, Mr. Bodell admitted that three days prior to the fire he
had purchased gasoline for the restaurant's use. 16 Mr. Bodell's
purchase had been charged to the account of Thomas Ciambrone, Jr., the owner and sole shareholder of Windmere, Inc.
(Windmere).1 7 Mr. Ciambrone's corporation owned the land
upon which the Crosswinds was located."8 Acting upon this information, the West Milford Police Department ordered Mr. Bodell to submit a voice exemplar in an attempt to ascertain
whether he was the anonymous caller.' 9 The Passaic County
Prosecutor's Office delivered both the voice exemplar and telephone recording to Voice Identification, Inc. (VII) for comparison. 20 The president of VII, Ernst F.V. Alexanderson, identified
Mr. Bodell as the anonymous caller.2 '
12 Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 208 N.J. Super. 697, 700, 506 A.2d
834, 835 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 105 N.J. 373, 522 A.2d 405 (1987).
13 Id. at 701, 506 A.2d at 836. In addition to the container, police found ajacket
with a set of keys, including a key to the rear door of the restaurant. Id.
14 Id. Mr. Bodell was an employee of T & J Trucking which was owned by
Thomas Ciambrone, Jr., president and sole stockholder of Windmere, Inc. which
owned the property upon which the Crosswinds Restaurant stood. Id. at 700-01.
Bodell did maintenance work at the restaurant when employment was scarce at T &
J Trucking. Id. at 701.
15 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 389, 522 A.2d at 413.
16 Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 701, 506 A.2d at 836. Bodell originally stated
that he purchased one gallon of gasoline to soften the asphalt at the restaurant in
order to fix a gas pipe. Id. At trial, he was asked to explain a credit card slip for two
gallons of gasoline. Id. at 701-02, 506 A.2d at 836. Bodell then recollected that he
had purchased two gallons, but had only used part of one gallon at the restaurant
and had taken the remainder home. Id. at 702, 506 A.2d at 836.
17 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 388-89, 522 A.2d at 412-13. Ciambrone lived in Florida,
but his brother operated the restaurant through the Crosswinds Restaurant Corporation. Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 700, 506 A.2d at 835.
18 Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 700, 506 A.2d at 835. Ciambrone had loaned his
corporation $89,960 in order to keep the restaurant in operation. Windmere, 105
N.J. at 388, 522 A.2d at 413. Although at trial, Windmere introduced evidence that
the Crosswinds was financially successful, the defendant, International Insurance
Company, countered with records indicating the restaurant had suffered losses totalling almost $194,000 from 1976 to 1982. Id. There was also evidence that
Windmere had been trying to sell the property. Id.
19 Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 702, 506 A.2d at 836.
20 Id.
21 Id. In a report, Mr. Alexanderson wrote: "We have completed our analysis
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In the interim, Windmere filed a claim with its insurer, International Insurance Co. (International), estimating losses of
$460,000 resulting from the fire. 22 International refused to pay
the claim, maintaining that Windmere was either directly or indirectly responsible for the fire.23 Windmere filed24suit against International to recover the proceeds of its claim.
At trial, the court held an evidentiary hearing to determine
the admissibility of VII's spectrogram of Mr. Bodell's voice,
which was proffered by International.25 The trial judge ruled
that spectrograms were reliable, and thus admissible when offered with both expert testimony and aural evidence of the exemplar and recorded tape for the jury's comparison.26 Upon
consideration of the evidence, including the testimony concerning the voiceprints, the jury returned a verdict in favor of International.27 On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the jury
verdict holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the
spectrographic evidence. 28 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
and have been able to identify ten matching words between the unknown caller and
Mr. Howard Bedell [sic]. Our aural examination concurs with the spectrographic
portion, and we feel sure beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Howard Bedell [sic]
made the bomb threat call." Id. Subsequent to Mr. Alexanderson's report, someone other than Bodell admitted making the phone call which placed the accuracy of
the voice expert's findings in doubt. Windmere, 105 NJ. at 389, 522 A.2d at 413.
22 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 388, 522 A.2d at 413. Windmere had a $600,000 insurance policy for fire loss on the building. Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 700, 506 A.2d
at 835.
23 Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 700, 506 A.2d at 835. Mr. Ciambrone was notified of the fire within an hour of the anonymous call to the police department by his
uncle, who lived near the restaurant. Id. Mr. Ciambrone called the president of the
bank holding the mortgage on the restaurant property and his insurance agent
soon thereafter. Id. at 701, 506 A.2d at 835-36. At trial, International asserted that
Mr. Ciambrone made these calls merely to establish his presence in Florida and his
ignorance of the fire. Id. at 701 n.1, 506 A.2d at 836 n.1.
24 Id. at 700, 506 A.2d at 835.
25 Id. at 703, 506 A.2d at 837. Mr. Alexanderson and Detective Lieutenant Lonnie Smrkovski, commanding officer of the Voice Identification Unit of the Michigan
Department of State Police, testified regarding the reliability of spectrograms. Id.
Windmere offered testimony by Professor LouisJ. Gerstman of the City University
of New York, Professor of Psychology, Speech and Hearing Sciences, against the
admissibility of spectrographic evidence. Id.
26 Id. The trial judge based his ruling on United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 713 n.1 1,
506 A.2d at 843 n. 11.
27 See Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 700, 506 A.2d at 835.
28 Id. at 713, 506 A.2d at 843. Judge O'Brien noted that although he found no
error in admitting the voiceprint evidence in this civil action, the court would
render no opinion regarding whether the evidence would be admissible in a criminal case. Id. at 713 n.12, 506 A.2d at 843 n.12 (citing State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super.
323, 239 A.2d 680 (Law Div. 1968)).

1988]

NOTES

409

granted certification. 9 The supreme court affirmed the jury
verdict, but held that the reliability of spectrogram analysis in
terms of general acceptance within the scientific community had
not been established, and therefore spectrogram analysis was
inadmissible.3"
Historically, most courts have applied an admissibility test
for novel scientific techniques that has been severely limiting. 3
This test, propounded in Frye v. United States,32 mandates that to
be admissible a scientific technique "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs." 3 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia developed this test in considering the admissibility of the systolic blood pressure deception test-a forerunner of the modern polygraph. 34 The court recognized that
novel scientific developments evolve through experimental and
demonstrable stages. 35 The court added that in order for a particular technique to enter the demonstrable, and therefore
admissible stage, general acceptance of the technique by the relevant scientific community would be required. 36 The general acceptance requirement "assures that those most qualified to assess
the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice." '37 This requirement has been difficult for many sci38
entific innovations to satisfy, among them voice spectrography.
The admissibility of voiceprint evidence under the Frye standard was first considered by New Jersey courts in State v. Cary.39
29 Windmere, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 104 N.J. 422, 517 A.2d 418 (1986).
30 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 385-86, 522 A.2d at 411-12.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Reed v.
State, 283 Md. 374, 384, 391 A.2d 364, 369 (1978).
32 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
33 Id. at 1014. The Frye court's two-page opinion did not contain any authority
or rationale for the test. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1205. The Frye court merely
stated that, "[n]umerous cases are cited in support of this rule." Frye, 293 F. at
1014.
34 Id. at 1013-14; Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1204 n.41.
35 Frye, 293 F. at 1014. Writing for the court, Justice Van Orsdel stated: "Ijiust
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized .... Id.
36 Id.
37 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38 See Giannelli, supra note 2 at 1208-28 (discussing problems resulting from a
strict application of the Frye test).
39 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), on remand 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680
(Law Div. 1968), reh'ggranted,53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), aft'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264
A.2d 209 (1970). Cary was the first written opinion on voiceprint admissibility is-
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In Cary, the police department recorded a telephone call containing information regarding a murder. 40 Upon a motion to the superior court, the Union County Prosecutor's Office sought an
order compelling the defendant, Paul Cary, to submit a voice exemplar for comparison with the police recording. 4 ' The State alleged that a voice identification expert could determinie whether
Cary's voice and that of the anonymous caller were the same.4 2
Cary to subThe trial judge granted the State's motion ordering
43
appealed.
Cary
and
recording
voice
a
mit to
The supreme court conditionally upheld the order, 44 remanding the matter to determine whether voiceprint technology
was "sufficiently accurate" to produce admissible results.4 5 Upon
a finding that the evidence was sufficiently accurate, the defendant would be compelled to submit a voice exemplar. 46 On remand, the Law Division of the Superior Court held that the
47
voiceprint technique lacked the requisite scientific acceptance.
The lower court stressed that the only evidence indicating scientific acceptance was the expert testimony of Lawrence Kersta, the
sued by any state or federal court. 49 N.J. at 352, 230 A.2d at 388. The Air Force
Board of Review had considered the issue a year earlier and held voiceprints admissible. United States v. Wright, 37 C.M.R. 835, 843 (A.F.B.R. 1966), aff'd, 37 C.M.R.
447 (1967). The voiceprint concept first appeared in New Jersey in State v. McKenna, 94 N.J. Super. 71, 226 A.2d 757 (Essex County Ct. 1967), when the court
ordered a criminal defendant to submit to a voiceprint without ruling on its admissibility. Cary, 49 N.J. at 352, 230 A.2d at 388.
40 Cary, 49 N.J. at 346, 230 A.2d at 385.
41

Id.

Id. Lawrence G. Kersta was retained by the state. Id. at 351, 230 A.2d at 388.
Kersta was a pioneer in the voiceprint field. Note, supra note 2, at 1168.
43 Cary, 49 N.J. at 345-46, 230 A.2d at 385. The order required Cary "to speak
in a normal, audible, conversational tone, to answer questions relative to his place
of birth and present military status, and to say on three occasions during the recording: 'Ah, I would like to, duh, the-I would like to talk to Sergeant on desk.' "
Id. at 346, 230 A.2d at 385. On appeal, Cary contended that compelling him to
speak violated his due process right and his privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
at 347, 230 A.2d at 386.
44 See id. at 352-53, 230 A.2d at 388-89. The court stated that upon a preliminary finding of admissibility, Mr. Cary could be ordered to submit to a voice test.
Id.
45 Id. at 352, 230 A.2d at 388-89. The court ruled that the order was conditional
on the lower court's preliminary finding of admissibility in order to safeguard
Cary's fourth amendment right to privacy. Id.
46 See id. at 352-53, 230 A.2d at 388-89.
47 State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 334, 239 A.2d 680, 685 (Law Div. 1968),
aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970). "The sole evidence in this case . .. is the
opinion of the one who is apparently the innovator of the technique and who claims
it is virtually infallible in producing voice identification." Id. at 334.
42
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man who had developed the technique. 48 Thus, the court ruled

that the evidence of voice identification was inadmissible because
"it [wa]s just too early to tell" whether voiceprints had gained
general scientific acceptance."9 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling without ruling on the issue.5"
Five years later, in State v. Andretta,5" the supreme court was
again confronted with the issue of whether voiceprint identification was generally accepted, and thus sufficient to compel a defendant to submit to a voiceprint test. 52 Andretta involved an

extortion prosecution in which incriminating statements were recorded during a telephone conversation between the defendants
and the victim. 53 The trial court denied the state's motion to
compel the defendants to submit to a spectrogram test, 5 4 and the

state appealed.55
The supreme court, in an opinion authored by Justice Proctor, held that scientific developments and judicial acceptance of
voiceprints since Cary no longer made it unreasonable to order
defendants to submit to voiceprint tests. 56 Although it acknowledged the growing support for spectrograms, the court made no
determination regarding its admissibility. 57 The court declared,

however, that "the [s]tate should at least be given the opportunity to conduct the test and then to sustain its burden of establishing that an identification of the defendants' voice (if any)
58
arrived at is sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial."
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 State v. Cary, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).

The state was given more than
a year to produce additional evidence. Id. at 18, 264 A.2d at 209-10. The court,
noting that the state was unable "to furnish any new and significant evidence,"
affirmed the lower court's ruling. Id.
51 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972).
52 Id. at 545, 296 A.2d at 644-45.
53 Id. at 545-46, 296 A.2d at 645.
54 Id. at 546, 296 A.2d at 645. The trial court held that the state had not established the scientific community's general acceptance of voiceprints. Id. Moreover,
the court ruled that the five year lapse between the recording of the phone conversation and the motion "precluded use of the method in any case." Id.
55 Id.

56 Id. at 551, 296 A.2d at 648. Justice Proctor noted that the support for the
technique rested on considerably more than the opinion of one man, which was the
Cary court's primary concern. Id. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
57 Andretta, 61 N.J. at 551, 296 A.2d at 648. In dicta, however, the court suggested a new standard for admissibility. Id. Justice Proctor stated that "any identification arrived at through the use of this method [must be] sufficiently reliable to be
admissible." Id.
58 Id. at 552, 296 A.2d at 648. By ordering the defendants to speak for the test,
the court reasoned that if an expert determined that the defendant's voice matched
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The issue of voiceprint admissibility first appeared in a civil
action in New Jersey in D'Arc v. D'Arc.59 In DArc, the plaintiff
sought to prove through voiceprints that her husband had attempted to have her murdered and thus was not entitled to alimony. 6° During the matrimonial proceedings, an evidentiary
hearing was held to determine the admissibility of the results of
the voiceprint test.6 '
In rendering an interlocutory order, the D'Arc court began
its analysis by noting that most jurisdictions had relied on the
Frye standard to determine whether evidence procured by means
of a novel scientific technique was admissible.62 The court observed, however, that several states, including New Jersey, had
apparently adopted a less rigorous test which required only a
showing of sufficient reliability before a technique was deemed
admissible.6 3 Moreover, the court added that "[i]t would appear
that in New Jersey a new scientific technique would be admissible
if it [met] either" test. 64
In its two-pronged decision, the court first held that not only
the unknown voice, the admissibility of the results of the test could then be argued
at a pre-trial hearing. Id. at 551-52, 296 A.2d at 648. If the test failed to positively
identify the defendants, the evidentiary issue would be moot because the state
would not offer the results. Id. at 552, 296 A.2d at 648. Cf.State v. Perez, 150 N.J.
Super. 166, 375 A.2d 277 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 75 N.J. 542, 384 A.2d 521 (1977).
In Perez, the defendant attempted to comment about the state's failure to offer
voiceprint results into evidence. Perez, 150 N.J. Super. at 170, 375 A.2d at 279. The
trial judge denied the request and affirmed the appellate division holding that no
scientific foundation had been placed on the record and the matter "was not a
proper subject of comment." Id.
59 157 N.J. Super. 553, 385 A.2d 278 (Ch. Div. 1978) (order denying admission
of voiceprints into evidence), aff'd on the othergrounds, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 421 A.2d
602 (App. Div. 1980), cert. denied, 85 N.J. 487, 427 A.2d 579 (1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 971 (1981).
6o D'Arc v. D'Arc, 164 N.J. Super. 226, 233-34, 395 A.2d 1270, 1274 (Ch. Div.
1978), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 175 N.J. Super. 598, 421 A.2d 602 (App. Div. 1980),
cert. denied, 85 N.J. 487, 427 A.2d 579 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 971 (1981). The
telephone recordings contained conversations during which one party, allegedly
Mr. D'Arc, offered $50,000 to murder Mrs. D'Arc. Id. at 233, 395 A.2d at 1274.
61 See D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. at 555, 385 A.2d at 279 (Ch. Div. 1978).
62 Id. at 559, 385 A.2d at 281.
63 Id. This test directs a trial judge "[t]o determine whether any identification
arrived at through the use of this method is sufficiently reliable to be admissible in
light of the proofs which will be adduced as to what the test shows." Id. (quoting
State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 551-52, 296 A.2d 644, 648 (1972)). Although in
D'ArcJudge Imbriani stated that Frye and.Andretta were different tests, not all courts
agree. Cf.United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (asserting that "general acceptance [is] nearly synonymous
with reliability").
64 D'Arc, 157 N.J. Super. at 559, 385 A.2d at 281.
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was there a lack of evidence demonstrating general acceptance
within the scientific community, but that the testimony appeared
to contradict the existence of any acceptance. 6 5 The court noted
that the proofs indicated a high degree of misidentification, and
an overwhelming lack of support for the technique's validity. 66
Furthermore, in reviewing Doctor Tosi's expert testimony on the
reliability of voiceprints, Judge Imbriani noted that general acceptance of the technique was not established merely by the fact
that "other scientists have not proven him wrong."' 67 Secondly,
the court held that the admissibility standard propounded in Andretta was also not met.68 Although Doctor Tosi's study regarding
the trustworthiness of voiceprint identification provided the
court with "more than the bare opinion of one man," the judge
cautioned "something more than the bare results of one major
study" was required.6 9 Moreover, the court reasoned that other
tests regarding voiceprint reliability were necessary in light of the
significant criticism of Tosi's study.7"
Increased debate and judicial acceptance of voice
spectography prompted the Supreme Court of New Jersey to
hear Windmere, Inc. v. InternationalInsurance Co. 7

The court, in a

unanimous opinion written by Justice O'Hern, initially noted that
questions regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence had
confronted the court in recent years.72 Although each case dealt
65 Id. at 562, 385 A.2d at 283. During the hearing, one expert testified that a
poll of approximately forty-one, well-respected scientists in the field revealed that
nearly all of them did not support the validity of the technique. Id. at 560, 385 A.2d
at 282.
66 See id.
67 Id. at 561, 385 A.2d at 282.
68 Id at 562, 385 A.2d at 283.
69 Id. at 562-63, 385 A.2d at 283.
70 Id. at 563, 385 A.2d at 283. The court noted that the Tosi's findings were
compromised by several procedural defects. Id. Primarily, the court noted the lack
of tests and studies confirming Tosi's work. Id. at 562, 385 A.2d at 283. The court
was also concerned that "only one-third of the Tosi tests were made in what could
be termed a forensic setting." Id. at 564, 385 A.2d at 284. The qualifications of the
voiceprint examiners were also questioned by the court. Id. These shortcomings
provided a level of doubt that the court could not overlook. Id. at 565, 385 A.2d at
284.
71 See Windmere, 105 N.J. at 375-76, 522 A.2d at 405.
72 Id. at 377-78, 522 A.2d at 407 (citing State v. Matulewicz, 101 N.J. 27, 499
A.2d 1363 (1985) (admissibility of laboratory report of controlled dangerous substances); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (reliability of battered
woman's syndrome); Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984) (admissibility of breathalyzer test); State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982)
(rape tendency diagnosis unreliable); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86
(1981) (admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony)). Although it acknowl-
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with a different scientific technique, the majority observed that a
common strand in each of the court's prior decisions was a basic
adherence to the Cary rationale. 73 The Cary standard, which
closely resembles the Frye test, requires scientific test results to
have a "sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results and . . . contribute materially to the ascer-

74
tainment of the truth" in order to be admitted into evidence.
The court emphasized that once judicial approval was established, judicial notice would be taken of the technique's reliability
in the future.75 Justice O'Hern explained that proving the required reliability could be accomplished either by knowledgeable
expert testimony, authoritative scientific literature, or judicial acceptance of the technique.7 6
With regard to expert testimony, the court recognized that
finding unanimity of expert opinion on scientific evidence was
virtually impossible.77 Justice O'Hern noted the difficulties in establishing the parameters of "the community and the degree of
acceptance within that scientific community."'78 Of particular
concern to the court was that the science of voiceprint analysis
emanates from a sole source, the Michigan State University
Speech and Hearing Research Laboratory.79 Therefore, after
recognizing the experts' limited experience and their potential
prejudice, the court reasoned that more than one experimental
source would be required before voiceprints could attain a level
of reliability for admissibility purposes.80 As a result, the court

edged that all five cases involved the use of scientific evidence in a criminal action,
the court stated that the principles would be applicable in a civil context as well. Id.
at 378, 522 A.2d at 407.
73 See id. at 377-78, 522 A.2d at 407-08.
74 Id. at 378, 522 A.2d at 407-08 (quoting State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 352, 230
A.2d 384, 389 (1967)). See also Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir.
1923) and supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
75 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 379, 522 A.2d at 408. The reliability of a scientific procedure does not vary from case-to-case. See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 391
A.2d 364, 367 (1978). Therefore, once the procedure is accepted by a court, judicial notice of the technique will be taken to save time. See id.
76 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 379, 522 A.2d at 408 (citing State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508,
521, 443 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1982)).
77 See id. at 379, 522 A.2d at 408.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 380, 522 A.2d at 408. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 38, 549 P.2d
1240, 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 153 (1976). The California Supreme Court, expressing a similar view, noted that the expert "may be too closely identified with
the endorsement of voiceprint analysis to assess fairly and impartially the nature
and extent of any opposing scientific views." Id.
80 See Windmere, 105 N.J. at 381, 522 A.2d at 409. The court noted that the evidence did not reach the level of reliability required by Romano v. Kimmelman. Id.
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concluded that the testimony of two prominent advocates of the
voiceprint technique did not meet the "general acceptance"
standard. 8 '
Addressing the second mode of establishing reliability, the
court determined that authoritative scientific literature also failed
to demonstrate acceptance of the technique.8 2 Justice O'Hern
noted that although the voiceprint subject had sparked considerable controversy, even the technique's opponents conceded that
it had some value.8 3 Further, the majority observed that several
jurisdictions had noted the lack of acceptance of voiceprints in
scientific literature.8 4 Thus, the court concluded that the difference of opinion among the relevant journals evidenced a want of
universal acceptance of the voiceprint device.8 5
Finally, the court asserted that there was no general acceptance by the judiciary of spectrogram analysis. 8 6 Justice O'Hern
observed the extensive disparity of decisions concerning the device.8 7 Although universal harmony among the jurisdictions
might never be realized, the justice posited that more dispositive
at 381-82, 522 A.2d at 409 (citing Romano v. Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1
(1984)).
81 Id. at 382, 522 A.2d at 410. The court also noted that Lieutenant Smrkovski
testified that the voiceprint device "lacked scientific consensus" and that the "scientific community was a 'divided camp.' " Id.
82 Id. at 383, 522 A.2d at 410.
83 Id. Professor Louis Gerstman, who testified for Windmere that spectrographic comparisons are unreliable, agreed that voiceprints can be used to exclude
a person as the unknown speaker. Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. 713, 506 A.2d at 843.
84 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 383, 522 A.2d at 410 (citing Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374,
391 A.2d 364 (1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 206, 327 N.E.2d
671, 679 (1975) (Kaplan, J., dissenting)).
85 Id. at 384, 522 A.2d at 411.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 384, 522 A.2d at 411. For cases which denied the scientific reliability of
voiceprints as evidence, Justice O'Hern cited: State v.Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 686
P.2d 1224 (1984); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1976); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978); People v. Tobey, 401
Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d
1277 (1977). Id. For cases which sustained the scientific reliability of voiceprints as
evidence, Justice O'Hern cited: United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v.Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1019 (1975); Alea v. State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State v.
Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327
N.E.2d 671 (1975); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d
432 (1971); People v. Bein, 114 Misc. 2d 1021, 453 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1982);
State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983); State v. Wheeler, 496
A.2d 1382 (R.I. 1985). Id.
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evidence of scientific reliability would be needed.88
Further, the court stated that in its previous decisions involving scientific evidence, a finding of reliability was predicated primarily upon objective factors. 89 The majority asserted that
subjective factors would be of minimal importance.90 Thus, once
reliability had been established, no further inquiry regarding the
technique's reliability would be conducted. 9 The court emphasized that this obviated the need for subsequent case-by-case determinations of a scientific technique's admissibility. 92
Finally, the court compared the applicable evidentiary standard of determining the admissibility of scientific evidence with
the Frye test.9 3 Justice O'Hern declared that the standard employed by the court was not a rejection of the Frye test.94 Rather,
the majority stressed that the Frye standard of general acceptance
"is a critical factor in finding that there is 'sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable results.'-9'
96
While noting that several courts, including the Third Circuit,

had rejected the Frye test, the court stated that New Jersey would
not.9" The court asserted that, should more reliable evidence be
introduced in future litigation, the admissibility standard might
be met. 8 For the present, however, the court held that
voiceprints are not reliable scientific evidence and are thus
inadmissible. 99

The decision in Windmere typifies the caution exercised by
the Supreme Court of New Jersey in admitting novel scientific
88
89

Windmere, 105 N.J. at 385, 522 A.2d at 411.
Id.

90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See id. Although condoning the case-by-case review of the admissibility of
hypnotic evidence, the court "prefer[red] not to take that approach here." Id. at
385 & n.6, 522 A.2d at 411 & n.6.
93 Id. at 386-87, 522 A.2d at 412.
94 Id. at 386, 522 A.2d at 412.
95 Id. (citing Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Romano v.
Kimmelman, 96 N.J. 66, 474 A.2d 1 (1984); State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525,432 A.2d 86
(1981); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967)).
96 Id. (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985)).
97 Id. Justice O'Hern reasoned that: "[Olur test has been applied too often, and
with satisfactory results, to depart from it now." Id.
98

Id.

99 See id. The court held that the admission of voiceprints by the lower court,
however, was harmless error based on the cumulative effect of the other evidence.
See id. at 389-90, 522 A.2d at 413-14. Post-trial developments in the case aided the
court in its determination that the voiceprints were unreliable. Id. at 387, 522 A.2d
at 412. See supra note 21.
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evidence.' 0 0 This caution resulted from the court's incorporation of the Frye general acceptance test into the Cary reliability
standard.'' By incorporating the Frye test into its analysis in
Windmere, the court has heightened the standard of admissibility
required by a proponent of scientific evidence. Although the
Windmere court recognized that a proponent has three separate
ways to prove reliability, the court posited that the defendant did
not prove the reliability of the scientific technique he sought to
introduce. 1 2 As to each test, however, the majority rejected the
evidence
reliability of voiceprint analysis because the scientific
10 3
acceptance.
general
of
level
failed to rise to the
Only two jurisdictions applying the Frye test have admitted
voiceprint evidence. 104 It naturally follows that meeting the general acceptance standard is difficult. This fact has led courts to
formulate new admissibility standards, among them the "reliability test."' 10 5 Basically, the reliability test requires that a proponent of scientific evidence establish that the technique is
sufficiently accurate to be meaningful in the forensic process. 0 6
The Cary standard requires a similar showing.' 0 7 The Cary court,
however, did not mandate "general acceptance in the scientific
100 See, e.g., State v. Cavallo, 88 N.J. 508, 443 A.2d 1020 (1982) (court refused to
admit a physician's testimony regarding a defendant's tendency to rape); State v.
Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981) (court refused to admit hypnotically-induced testimony).
101 See Windmere, 105 N.J. at 386, 522 A.2d at 412.
102 See id. at 379, 383-84, 522 A.2d at 408, 410-11. See supra notes 76-88 and
accompanying text.
103 See Windmere, 105 N.J. at 379, 383-84, 522 A.2d at 408, 410-11.
104 See Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973);
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). But cf. People v.
Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (holding voiceprints
inadmissible applying Frye test).
105 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979). In Williams, the Second Circuit established standards of admissibility for scientific evidence based upon reliability and tendency to mislead the jury.
Id. See also Note, supra note 2, at 1176-80 (discussing evidentiary standards).
106 See Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. The court emphasized that the spectrographic
evidence need not be found infallible, but rather, "[tihe sole question is whether
spectrographic analysis has reached a level of reliability sufficient to warrant its use
in the courtroom." Id. at 1198. In determining the reliability of scientific evidence,
the Second Circuit examined: (a) potential rate of error, (b) existence and maintenance of standards, (c) application of scientific technique, (d) analogy to similar
scientific techniques admitted into evidence, and (e) presence of "fail-safe" characteristics. Id. at 1198-99. The court added, however, that, "[t]he jury remains at
liberty to reject [scientific evidence] for any of a number of reasons, including a
view that the . . . technique itself is either unreliable or misleading." Id. at 1200.
107 Cary, 49 N.J. at 352, 230 A.2d at 389. Compare Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198
("reliability sufficient to warrant its use in the courtroom"), with Cary, 49 N.J. at
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community" as a "critical factor" in establishing reliability. 10 8
The Windmere court's incorporation of Frye to the Cary reliability
test has heightened the admissibility standard to a degree that is
nearly unattainable. This was apparent in the court's three-part
analysis.109
First, the court noted that the testimony of experts failed to
establish the general acceptance of voiceprints within the scientific community.' ' The qualifications of the proffered experts
appeared to satisfy the court's standard, however, the fact that
voiceprint technology was apparently a "sole source industry"
troubled the court."' This concern is legitimate, but unwarranted. Questions pertaining to the limited breadth of experts
should be directed to the weight, not the admissibility of the testimony. 1 2 A jury, apprised of the extent of an expert's experience, should be able to render a fair verdict considering the
3
totality of the evidence."1
Secondly, the court correctly determined that there was no
measure of universal acceptance of voiceprints in scientific literature.' 4 This is apparent, as our legal and scientific publications
are replete with articles advocating or opposing the application
of various scientific techniques. The continued appearance of
voiceprints in scientific and legal journals should have persuaded
the court that spectrographic analysis is not a transient science.
Again, the controversy regarding the accuracy of voiceprints as a
means of identification should be applicable in determining the
15
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility."
Finally, the court found no general acceptance of voiceprints
in judicial decisions." t6 It is not uncommon, however, to find a
split among jurisdictions on a legal issue. The court was appar352, 230 A.2d at 389 ("sufficiently accurate to produce results admissible as
evidence").
108 See Cary, 49 N.J. at 352, 230 A.2d at 389.
109 See Windmnere, 105 N.J. at 379-85, 522 A.2d at 408-11.
11o Id. at 379, 522 A.2d at 408. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
II I Windmere, at 380-81, 522 A.2d at 408-09. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
112 Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386-87, 391 A.2d 364, 370-71 (1978) (citing McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972)).
113 See id.
114 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 383, 522 A.2d at 410. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
115 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979).
116 Windmere, 105 N.J. at 384, 522 A.2d at 411. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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ently unmoved by the fact that three circuit courts have ruled in
favor of voiceprint admissibility. ' 7 Rather than join a growing
number of courts accepting the technique, the court
exercised
8
caution and refused to admit voiceprint evidence."
The application of a more liberal test, such as the Federal
Rules admissibility standard, may have produced a different result. Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence requires all relevant evidence to be admissible unless there are reasons for its
exclusion. 1 9 Relevant evidence may only be excluded if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' 2 ° In an identification context,
voiceprint evidence is undoubtedly relevant. Rule 702 permits
qualified expert testimony to aid the jury in understanding scientific test results. 1
Under this admissibility standard, if
voiceprint evidence is relevant and if the expert is qualified, the
evidence is admissible. 22 The evidence could be excluded, however, if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by other
23
factors.1

Another advantage of the Federal Rules standard is that the
final determination rests with the jury. 24 If the proofs are not
persuasive, the jury is free to reject the test as unreliable. 125 The
lower court in Windmere applied this reasoning and allowed the
117 See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). The
Third Circuit has not ruled on voiceprint admissibility. See United States v. Baynes,
687 F.2d 659, 671 (3d Cir. 1982).
118 See Windmere, 105 N.J. at 386, 522 A.2d at 412.
I 19 Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "All relevant evidence is
admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States,
by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
120 FED. R. EVID. 403.
121 Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "Ifscientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R. EVID. 702.
122 Note, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Voice Spectrography, 17 AKRON L. REv.
701, 705 (1984).
123 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
124 United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1200 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1117 (1979).
125 Id.
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jury to consider both the results of the voiceprint tests and the
actual tapes. 126 This should dispel any notion that scientific evidence admitted without general acceptance creates a "false air of
scientism." 127 Finally, although the Federal Rules standard
forces courts to make case-by-case admissibility determinations,
this creates no additional hardship on the courts. Even though
the Windmere court preferred a standard that did not require
judges to make case-by-case admissibility decisions, 28 a judge
must continue to consider the admissibility issue in each and
every new scientific development case until the technique meets
the Cary test.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey appears hesitant to allow
the admissibility of any novel scientific technique without a showing of reliability in terms of general acceptance in the scientific
community akin to that enunciated in Frye. This caution could be
circumvented by eliminating Frye as a "critical factor." This, in
turn, would lessen the showing required for the Cary reliability
standard. The court should also explore the possibility, as other
states have done, of following the Federal Rules admissibility approach.2 9 Until the court decides to take such measures, the admissibility of many scientific developments will be chilled.
Michael S. Fletcher
126 Windmere, 208 N.J. Super. at 714, 506 A.2d at 843. In his charge to the jury,
the trial judge declared:
Now, just because a man has testified as an expert does not mean that
you must accept his opinion as correct. You should weigh and consider
his testimony just as you would that of any other witness and make your
own determination as to whether his testimony and his opinion is true
and correct.
Id. at 712 n.10, 506 A.2d at 842 n.10.
127 See Windmere, 105 N.J. at 383, 522 A.2d at 410.
128 Id. at 385, 522 A.2d at 411.
129 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1117 (1979); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1019 (1975); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 400, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting).

